Abstract. A real is called properly n-generic if it is n-generic but not n + 1-generic. We show that every 1-generic real computes a properly 1-generic real. On the other hand, if m > n 2 then an m-generic real cannot compute a properly n-generic real.
Introduction
The notions of measure and category (or in forcing terminology, random (Solovay) and Cohen forcing) have made their way into computability theory via the notions of restricted randomness and genericity. Restricted genericity for Cohen reals was introduced by Jockusch [Joc80] , who studied n-genericity, that is, genericity where the forcing relation is restricted to n-quantifier arithmetic (as Jockusch and Posner [JP78] observed, a real is n-generic iff for all Σ 0 n sets of strings S, there is some initial segment σ of A such that σ ∈ S or σ ⊆ τ for all τ ∈ S.) Restricted genericity gives rise to a proper hierarchy (every n + 1-generic real is also n-generic but not vice-versa). Thus, we can define a real to be properly n-generic iff it is n-generic and not n + 1-generic. [A related notion, first discussed by Kurtz [Kur81] , is that of weak n-genericity. Here a real A is weakly n-generic iff A meets all dense Σ 0 n sets of strings. Kurtz [Kur81] showed that weak genericity refines the genericity hierarchy, with n-generic weakly n + 1-generic n + 1-generic.]
The study of reals random at various levels of the arithmetical hierarchy was introduced by Martin-Löf [ML66] . A real A is called n-random iff for all Σ 0 n -tests {U n : n ∈ N}, we have A / ∈ n U n . Here, a Σ 0 n -test is a (uniform) collection of Σ 0 n -classes {U n : n ∈ N}, such that µ(U n ) 2 −n , where µ is Lebesgue measure. (We refer the reader to Downey, Hirschfeldt, Nies and Terwijn [DHNT] for a general introduction to results relating genericity, randomness and relative computability, as well as to the forthcoming books Nies [Nie] and Downey and Hirschfeldt [DH] .)
Both n-genericity and n-randomness can be relativized to a given real Z by replacing Σ 0 n objects by ones that are Σ 0 n relative to Z. For instance, a real A is n-random over Z iff A / ∈ n U n for all tests {U n : n ∈ N} that are Σ 0 n relative to Z. It is easy to see that a real is n-generic iff it is 1-generic over ∅ (n−1) . Kurtz [Kur81] showed that this is also true for randomness; that is, a real is n-random iff it is 1-random over ∅ (n−1) . There are striking similarities between the ways these two notions interact with Turing reducibility. For example, relatively 1-generic reals form minimal pairs, as All of the authors were supported by the Singapore Institute for Mathematical Sciences for much of this research. Additionally, Downey and Greenberg are partially supported by the New Zealand Marsden Fund for basic research. Csima is partially supported by Canadian NSERC Discovery Grant 312501. Hirschfeldt is partially supported by the U.S. NSF grant DMS-05-00590.
do relatively 2-random reals. Another nice example is van Lambalgen's Theorem (van Lambalgen [VL87] ) which says that A ⊕ B is n-random iff A is n-random and B is n-random over A; Yu [Yu06] proved the analogous statement for genericity.
There are interesting distinctions as well. For example, there are complete ∆ 0 2 1-random reals, whereas all 1-generic reals are generalised low. This paper is motivated by a result of Miller and Yu [MY] :
Theorem 1.1 (Miller and Yu) . Let A be 1-random over a real Z, and let B be 1-random and computable in A. Then B is 1-random over Z.
[This result follows from van-Lambalgen's theorem in the case that Z has 1-random degree.] In particular, letting Z = ∅ (n−1) , if A is n-random and B T A, with B 1-random, then B is n-random. Asking whether the same property holds for Cohen genericity yields both a similarity and a distinction from the random case. We will show that the analogue of Miller and Yu's result holds in the generic case, if the bottom real B is 2-generic: Theorem 1.2. Let A be 1-generic over a real Z, and let B be 2-generic and computable in A. Then B is 1-generic over Z.
As a result, it is impossible for, say, a 3-generic real to compute a properly 2-generic real. We mention that Theorem 1.2 may be known, but is not yet found in print, and so we include a proof here.
On the other hand, the analogue of Miller and Yu's result always fails when 2-genericity is reduced to 1-genericity: Theorem 1.3. Every 1-generic real computes a properly 1-generic real.
In fact we prove something somewhat stronger. Theorem 1.4. Every 1-generic real computes a 1-generic real that is not weakly 2-generic.
We mention some related results: Haught [Hau86] showed that below 0 ′ , the 1-generic degrees are downward closed; Martin showed that for n 2, the ngeneric degrees are downward dense (see [Joc80] ). More such results are surveyed in [GM03] , which gives some applications.
Several questions remain: Question 1.5. Can a sufficiently generic real compute a weakly 2-generic real that is not 2-generic? Must it?
A degree is properly 1-generic if it contains a 1-generic real but no 2-generic real. Turing functionals are codes of partial computable functions from 2 ω to 2 ω . Formally, a Turing functional is a c.e. set Φ ⊂ 2 <ω × 2 <ω that is consistent:
As usual, during a construction, at each stage, all expressions involving dynamic objects are evaluated according to the state of the objects (either constructed or given) at the stage. Usual conventions apply; if during a construction we approximate a ∆ 0 2 set A, then the value of A on every x is carried over from one stage to the next unless we explicitly act to change that value.
If σ, τ ∈ 2 <ω then στ denotes the concatenation of σ and τ . A digit i ∈ {0, 1} often stands for the string i . If σ ∈ 2 <ω and k < ω then σ k is the concatenation of σ with itself k times.
We let W 0 , W 1 , . . . , be a uniform enumeration of all c.e. subsets of 2 <ω . The enumeration is arranged so that at every stage s > 0, there is exactly one string σ and one e such that σ enters W e at stage s. We also assume that if e s then W e is empty at stage s.
A positive result
We prove Theorem 1.2: Let A be 1-generic over a real Z, and let B be 2-generic and computable in A. Then B is 1-generic over Z.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let A be 1-generic over Z and let B T A be 2-generic. Let Φ be a Turing functional such that Φ(A) = B. Let W ⊆ 2 <ω be c.e. in Z; we may assume that W is closed upwards.
Suppose that B / ∈ W. LetW = {σ ∈ 2 <ω : Φ(σ) ∈ W }. CertainlyW is c.e. in Z. Since A / ∈W and A is 1-generic over Z, we know that there is some σ * ⊂ A with no extension inW .
The set U is co-c.e., and B / ∈ U, so since B is 2-generic, there is some τ * ⊂ B with no extension in
Thus τ * has no extension in W .
Computing properly 1-generic sets
In this section we prove theorem 1.4: Every 1-generic real X computes a 1-generic real that is not weakly 2-generic.
To do this, we construct a Turing functional Γ with the following properties:
(1) There is a dense Π 0 2 (0 ′ ) class that is contained in the domain of Γ, and whose image under Γ consists of 1-generic sets.
(2) The range of Γ is contained in a nowhere dense Π 0 1 (0 ′ ) class.
To see that this suffices, assume that X is weakly 2-generic (if X is not weakly 2-generic then we are of course done). Let A be the class guaranteed by (1). The real X is an element of any dense Σ 0 1 (0 ′ ) class, hence of any countable intersection of such classes; so X ∈ A. Then Γ(X) (which is computable by X) is 1-generic by (1), and is not weakly 2-generic because by (2), it misses a dense open set enumerable by 0 ′ .
3.1. Discussion.
3.1.1. Getting property 1. To make the image of A under Γ consist of 1-generic sets, for each e < ω, we must construct a dense, open set S e such that for all σ ∈ S e , Γ(σ) decides W e ; and further we must make the sequence S 0 , S 1 , . . . uniformly enumerable by 0 ′ , so that we can define A = e S e . We need to ensure that A is dense; by Baire's theorem, it is sufficient to ensure that each S e is dense.
Consider W 0 . A simple plan for meeting it would be setting S 0 = 2 ω and acting as follows: if W 0 is empty, do nothing; if there is some τ ∈ W 0 , let Γ( ) = τ . Now move to W 1 . Of course, this plan is not effective, so we must use the priority method for our construction. Again, a naïve approach would be as follows: While W 0 is empty, do nothing, and let weaker requirements (W 1 , W 2 , . . . ) act if they want to. If some string τ enters W 0 then injure the weaker requirements and set Γ( ) = τ . The problem here is that we cannot cancel the axioms that our work for W 1 , W 2 , . . . had us enumerating into Γ, so if we want to keep Γ consistent, we cannot make the definition we like. The solution is to break up the playing ground into pieces, let weaker requirements work on some of the pieces, and make sure that there is sufficient room for the stronger requirement to act if necessary.
Here is the strategy for W 0 . In the beginning, we mark the interval 2 ω = [ ] to work on W 0 . We break the interval up into infinitely many disjoint subintervals whose union is dense in 2 ω , say At a later stage, some string τ enters W 0 . Only finitely many subintervals have been spoiled for W 0 ; so we can define Γ to be τ everywhere else. On the spoiled intervals, we need to work again for W 0 ; since definitions of Γ have been made on possibly small subsubintervals, we need to break the spoiled region into small intervals on which we individually work on W 0 .
We let S 0 be the collection of intervals [σ] that are "good" for W 0 , which are those intervals on which we ensure that Γ(σ) meets W 0 , and those at which we had a correct belief that [Γ(σ)] ∩ W 0 = ∅. This set will in fact be d.c.e., and so certainly Σ 0 2 ; and reals in S 0 will satisfy the W 0 requirement. We need to ensure that S 0 is dense; this holds because we break it up into finer and finer subintervals (each time our hopes for an easy win are dashed).
The strategy for weaker W e is similar, except that of course we need to take into consideration injury by stronger requirements.
3.1.2. Getting property 2. To ensure that the range of Γ is nowhere dense, we could, whenever we define some axiom Γ(σ) = τ , pick some extension τ ′ of τ and declare that no value of Γ may ever extend τ ′ . This straightforward approach, however, interferes with the priority mechanism that ensures property (1), in the following way. Suppose that we mark some interval [σ 0 ] for W 1 , and later define Γ(σ 1 ) = τ for some σ 1 ⊃ σ 0 , marking [σ 1 ] for W 2 . We then declare that the range of Γ must be disjoint from [ρ], where ρ ⊃ τ . A later W 0 action elsewhere invalidates [σ 0 ]'s marking, so we mark [σ 1 ] for W 0 . Then, some string extending ρ enters W 0 , but W 0 is prohibited from winning by directing Γ through that string on a subinterval of [σ 1 ]. We will indeed direct Γ to go through some extension τ ′ of τ that is incomparable with ρ, and this presumably will give us another chance of attacking W 0 ; but this process may repeat itself, since following the straightforward approach compels us to first declare some extension ρ ′ of τ ′ disjoint from the range of Γ. After infinitely many failed attempts at meeting W 0 we have a real in the range of Γ belonging to the closure of W 0 but not to W 0 itself. This in fact must happen, because we made the collection of prohibited intervals a dense c.e. class, ensuring that no element of the range of Γ is even weakly 1-generic (indeed, the recursion theorem and the "slowdown lemma" imply that there is some e such that W e is the set of prohibited intervals, and that every σ is enumerated into W e only after it was declared prohibited). The solution is to use the priority mechanism that was introduced for getting property (1). When we define Γ(σ) = τ for meeting W e , we define one extension to be prohibited with priority e. This prohibition can be ignored by strings σ ′ ⊂ σ that are working for stronger W e ′ . The whole mechanism does the work for us, so we in fact do not need to use the word "prohibited" during the construction, just to make Γ(σ) long enough.
Construction. Here is the formal construction.
In the beginning, the entire space 2 ω = [ ] is marked active for W 0 . (When we mark a clopen set [σ] active for some W e , we also say that the string σ is marked active for W e .) At stage s: 1. A string τ is enumerated into some W e . Suppose that there is some σ that is active for W e , such that Γ(σ) ⊆ τ (there will be at most one such σ). Do the following:
• Unmark [σ] from being active for W e . Choose a very large number m.
• 
This completes the construction. An illustration of a typical turn of events is given in Figures 1-3 . Figure 2 . Action was taken for the middle subinterval. Its mark and the marks of its subintervals were removed. It is broken into smaller subintervals; on one we have a positive win for W 2 and so it is marked for W 3 ; on the rest we go back to work on W 2 :
W3
Figure 3. Later, action is taken for the original W 1 -interval. The previous W 2 and W 3 markings are cancelled, and the original interval is broken into small subintervals:
Here are some facts that follow from the instructions given and may clarify the construction a little.
Lemma 3.1.
(1) Suppose that at the beginning of stage s, a string σ is already active for W e . Then for all k < s, the string σ0 k 1 is active for W e+1 , and no string extending σ0 s is active for any W e ′ . (2) If at stage s, compatible strings σ and σ ′ are marked for W e and W e ′ respectively, and e < e ′ , then σ ⊂ σ ′ . (3) Each string can be marked as active for at most one W e , at most once.
Proof. The point is that if at some stage s, action is taken for some string σ, then all marks are removed from all extensions of σ, and new marks are only given to very long extensions of σ that we didn't deal with previously. At the second part of the stage, we mark extensions of these new, long strings; and for every string σ ′ that was already active for W e at the beginning of the stage (and whose mark was not removed during the stage, i.e. if σ ′ ⊇ σ), we mark σ ′ 0 s 1 (which was never dealt with before) for W e+1 ; we also mark some of this string's extensions.
We define S e , the success set for W e . At the beginning of a stage s, the approximation for this success set is S e [s]. There are two ways into S e , which give rise to a partition of S e into two sets S If σ is a string that at stage s becomes marked for some W e , then at s we define Γ(σ) = ν σ 1 for some ν σ ∈ 2 <ω . Note that this is the only time at which we enumerate (σ, τ ) into Γ for any string τ ; so Γ(σ) does not change after stage s; again refer to Lemma 3.1. Proof. By induction on s. Suppose this holds for s. At stage s, say we first act for some interval σ which was marked for W e . By the instructions given, all proper extensions of σ lose any markings they may have, and by the definition of S e , these strings are now removed from R. If σ ′ , σ ′′ are two extensions of σ that are now put into R, then we define ν σ and ν σ ′ to be incomparable. If σ ′ ⊃ σ is now put into R and σ ′′ ∈ R [s] is "old", and σ ′ ⊥ σ ′′ , then σ ′′ ⊥ σ and so ν σ ′′ ⊥ ν σ ⊂ ν σ ′ . At the second step of the stage, more intervals are added to R, but always refining intervals that are already in R; if we mark [σ0 k 1] for some W e+1 then we define ν σ0 k 1 = Γ(σ)σ0 k 1 and so incomparability is assured.
Here are some more observations. Proof. For (1), note that if σ is removed from R at stage t then some extension is put into R immediately. For (2), note in fact that if σ is removed from R at stage t then all extensions of σ of length t are placed into Q; and if σ ∈ 2 <s is placed into R at stage t then both extensions of length |σ| + 1 are placed into Q at the same stage. [For the latter assertion, note that if σ is marked for some W e then both σ1 and σ01 are marked for W e+1 at the same stage, which puts both σ1 and σ0 into Q at that stage.] Corollary 3.4. Suppose that σ ∈ e S e (at the end of time). Then for no σ ′ do we have Γ(σ ′ ) ⊇ ν σ 0.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there is some σ ′ such that Γ(σ ′ ) ⊇ ν σ 0. We cannot have σ and 
We now are ready to verify properties (1) and (2). For simplicity of notation, we let (at every stage) S −1 = { }.
Lemma 3.5. Each S e is dense, and so A = e S e is dense too.
Proof. We take some σ ∈ S e−1 and show that S e is dense in [σ] . Suppose that σ is put into S e−1 at stage s 0 .
We first note that if some [σ ′ ] ⊂ [σ] is ever marked active for W e at a stage s s 0 , then there is a subinterval of [σ ′ ] that is (permanently) in S e . This is because either no action is taken for σ ′ , in which case for every k < ω, the string σ ′ 0 k 1 is in S e , or action is taken for σ ′ at some stage s, in which case σ ′ 0 s is in S e . The point is that these markings cannot be eliminated by action below σ ′ , because such action would remove σ from S e−1 (note that there are no marked strings between σ and σ ′ ). Let ρ ⊃ σ and suppose for a contradiction that [ρ] ∩ S e = ∅. Let s 1 > s 0 , |ρ|, and find some σ ′ ∈ S e [s 1 ] compatible with ρ (so σ ′ ⊃ σ). There is a later stage s 2 at which σ ′ is extracted from S e ; at that stage, all successors of σ ′ at some level m > |ρ| are marked active for W e . At least one of these successors σ ′′ is compatible with ρ, and so must actually extend ρ. The string σ ′′ has some extension that is in S e , a contradiction.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that X ∈ S e . Then some initial segment of Γ(X) determines W e .
(Note that we do not assume that Γ(X) is total.) Proof. Suppose that σ ∈ S e and σ ⊂ X. If σ ∈ S + e , then Γ(σ) extends some string in W e . If σ ∈ S − e , then no τ ⊃ Γ(σ ′ ) is ever enumerated into W e (where σ = σ ′ 0 k 1 for some k; note that σ ′ is always marked for W e ). Proof. The second part follows immediately from the lemma. For the first part, apply the lemma to the sets W en = 2 n for n ∈ ω.
Lemma 3.8. Γ[2 ω ] is contained in a nowhere dense Π 0 1 (0 ′ ) class.
Proof. Let T be the downward closure of the range of Γ, viewed as a relation on strings, i.e.
T is c.e., and so [T ], the class of paths through T , is a Π 0 1 (0 ′ ) class that contains the image of Γ on 2 ω . The class [T ] is closed, so to show that it is nowhere dense, it suffices to show that it does not contain any interval. Suppose for a contradiction that [ρ] is an interval contained in [T ] , which means that every extension of ρ is in T . By the definition of T , there are some σ and τ such that (σ, τ ) ∈ Γ and τ ⊇ ρ. There is some σ ′ extending σ which is in e S e . Then ν σ ′ ⊇ τ , and by Corollary 3.4, ν σ ′ 0 is not on T ; this is a contradiction.
